The Whims of War – Part 7
A month ago, I wrote that the conflict in Iran is likely to continue for many more weeks, if not months. Little has changed since then. In the interim, the Iranians have submitted another (but not significantly different) peace proposal which President Trump immediately rejected, stating that “it is TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE” and warning that “the current ceasefire is on massive life support.” Because his own credibility is wearing thin, he also had his aides warn that “he is now more seriously considering a major resumption of combat operations.” From the Iranians’ perspective, however, his words have not been supported by his actions.
The Iranians are also undoubtedly mindful that President Trump currently needs Congressional approval to continue the war; and obtaining that approval could be a significant (although probably not an insurmountable) obstacle. That’s because the war is very unpopular with over 60% of Americans disapproving it. While Republican members of Congress are generally willing to support Trump’s every request, this is an election year. Therefore, forcing Republican legislators to approve a continuance of a war could virtually assure a Democratic sweep in the Fall elections.
To circumvent this obstacle, the Trump administration seems to be leaning toward a strategy of legislative legerdemain. To that end, it has announced that the war which it began in late February came to an end with the current negotiated “cease-fire.” Accordingly, any resumption in fighting would “constitute a new war.” That reasoning would give the administration another 60 days in which to pursue further combat operations without Congressional approval. Consonant with this strategy, Defense Secretary Hegseth announced that “Operation Epic Fury” (the name of the current military operations in Iran) would be superseded by “Operation Sledgehammer.” While this ruse may sound fanciful, you shouldn’t forget that our Supreme Court recently altered legal precedents dating back to the Magna Carta to rule that President Trump can’t be held criminally responsible for illegal actions taken in his official capacity.
What makes peace with Iran so elusive is that, in addition to the leaders of both nations being extremely reluctant to display any sign of weakness, they are also extremely distrustful of each other. Accordingly, if there is to be a path to peace they must not only determine the respective obligations of the parties, but also fashion ways to compel the other to abide by its undertakings. It also seemingly requires the parties proceed one step at a time and thereby slowly become more trusting of each other. The want of trust among the parties largely explains why it took the Obama administration 20 months to complete the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
In addition, there are other parties with a stake in the outcome of any peace negotiations. Most important among them is Israel which would like to prolong the war as long as possible so it will have a further opportunity to erode Iran’s ability to attack it. Recall that Iran warned the Trump administration that Israel was launching attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon in violation of their cease-fire understanding. Rather than put a stop to those attacks, however, President Trump simply admonished the Israelis “to go slow”, a response which undoubtedly did little to assure the Iranians that they could depend on the U.S. to keep the Israelis in check.
Similarly, Hezbollah and the Houthis could conceivably take actions which undermine the Iranians’ efforts to fashion a peace agreement. Although they appear to act independently of Iran, in reality they rarely do so without Iran’s tacit, if not express, approval. Moreover, the Iranians invariably take the position that these groups (as well as Hamas) are independent entities and disclaim responsibility for their actions. For this reason, both the Trump administration and the Israeli government rightly harbor a strong distrust of the Iranians.
At this point, both the U.S. and Israel have suspended bombing of targets within Iran even though the U.S. has blockaded Iran’s ports and has attacked Iranian vessels in or around the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, the U.S. has undertaken minor efforts to escort cargo ships through the Strait. Iran, however, has significant firepower overlooking the Strait and occasionally opens fire on ships seeking to transit the Strait without it’s express permission. While these relatively sporadic events have not caused a breakdown of the current cease-fire agreement, they have generally been sufficient to reduce shipping through the Strait to a very small fraction of its pre-war level as insurance companies are refusing to insure all loses incurred in doing so. In addition, Iran has continued to launch occasional aerial attacks on those Persian Gulf countries allied with the U.S. in retaliation for the U.S.’s blockade of its ports.
While it would appear that Iran is perfectly content to prolong the status quo, President Trump seems to be growing increasingly more exasperated with the continuing conflict. Over the past month hardly a day has passed when he didn’t make a statement warning the Iranians that if they don’t submit to his peace demands he would resume bombing targets inside Iran. In fact, Trump appears to be encountering increasing difficulty actually articulating an escalation in his threats. In any event, they are having only a minute effect on Iran’s willingness to acquiesce to Trump’s demands which are primarily aimed at having Iran allow traffic through the Strait, surrender its enriched uranium and abandon its nuclear ambitions.
The most pressing problem that must be resolved is to find a way to reopen the Strait to shipping. Asserting control over the Strait is currently the Iranians’ trump (no pun intended) card; and they are not likely to relax their control of the Strait for more than a few days as long as the U.S. maintains its blockage of Iranian ports. Conversely, the U.S. and Israel are maintaining their forces in a position to resume their aerial attacks until Iran agrees to their demands. Thus, the first step must be for the U.S. to discontinue its blockade of Iran’s ports. This will prompt the Iranians to permit shipping to pass through the Strait at least for a short period during which it will expect the Trump administration to start making proposals to relax economic sanctions currently being imposed upon it, including lifting trade embargoes.
A second important economic demand of the Iranians will be for the U.S. to agree to paying reparations for the damage that the bombing attacks have caused. This too will have to be agreed upon relatively quickly as Iran is unlikely to allow the Strait to remain open for more than a few weeks to enable the scope of this issue to be agreed upon and its implementation initiated. Specifically, the parties will have to agree upon what economic concessions the U.S. is willing to make and when and how they will be placed in effect.
This will be a bitter pill for President Trump who is highly reluctant to make any economic concessions to the Iranians because he is already under attack at home for the expenses previously incurred in the war. In addition, he has now set down a “red line” that the U.S. will make no concessions until the Iranians meet one or more of his principal demands which include steps toward limiting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This could be in the form of an agreement to reinstate at least some of the terms it agreed to in the JCPOA, including on-site inspections.
An overhanging problem is that Trump is unlikely to enter into any deal that makes him appear less successful in reducing the nuclear threat posed by Iran than what the Obama administration achieved in the JCPOA. That’s a very tall order since the pressure on Iranians to concede to Trump’s demands seem much less than the pressure on President Trump to quickly conclude the conflict. Moreover, the JCPOA was negotiated at a time when the U.S. enjoyed a reputation for reliability. That reputation was scotched when President Trump repudiated the JCPOA and reinitiated economic sanctions against Iran. Accordingly, the Iranians will rightly contend that they need to proceed with their development of nuclear weapons as insurance against any breach of whatever understanding they might reach.
This past week President Trump emphasized that in view of Iran’s hostile actions toward the U.S. over the past 47 years, the U.S. simply cannot allow Iran to develop and possess nuclear weapons. While this may or may not have been President Trump’s original motivation for beginning the war, this seems like his most reasonable justification for his having taken that action, even though most experts believe that it still may be at least a few years before Iran becomes nuclear-armed. Of course, President Trump’s determination that Iran not be allowed to have nuclear weapons probably has as much to do with his unwillingness to settle for a deal that is less favorable than the one negotiated by the Obama administration as it does with Iran’s long hostility toward the U.S. In any event, it seems unlikely that President Trump will conclude negotiations without obtaining some concessions from Iran on the nuclear weapons issues, but it’s unlikely to be as comprehensive as Trump has been demanding.
The value of a nation’s possession of nuclear weapons is not at all clear. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that no nation will ever employ a nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapons have been around since 1945 and are now possessed by nine countries (the U.S., Russia, the U.K., France, Israel, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea). Since acquiring nuclear weapons, five of those countries (the U.S., Russia, Israel, Pakistan and India) have been involved in serious military conflicts and none of them has chosen to utilize them. Former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger coined the term “Mutually Assured Destruction” to describe why nations possessing nuclear weapons would no longer employ them; namely, because it would invite other nations to use them against the original user.
For that same reason, nuclear weapons have proven to be of limited use in deterring nation’s from attacking those with nuclear arms. For example, Israel has had nuclear weapons since the 1960s and has been subject to “existential attacks” by its neighbors on at least two subsequent occasions. Similarly, India and Pakistan have had numerous military conflicts while they both possessed nuclear weapons and both have wisely chosen NOT to employ them. It’s not just the smaller nuclear-armed nations that have adopted this course of action. Both the U.S. and Russia have been involved in the war in Ukraine and they too declined to employ them even though it was a serious concern to the Biden administration in gauging its attacks against Russia.
Iran is very much in the same position that North Korea was just a few years ago. North Korea was a “Pariah nation” in that it was considered an outcast by the international community and faced severe diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions. Fearing that it might become a target for military action, it pursued the development of nuclear weapons. When it achieved that goal, it was immediately embraced by President Trump who felt that he could talk Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s young leader, into giving up his country’s nuclear weapons. This sent out a strong message that when you have nuclear weapons other countries will treat you with greater respect. This lesson was not lost on the Mullahs who rule Iran as since then Iran has been determined to develop its own nuclear weapons.
Iran, however, is a far more formidable foe than North Korea. Its population is over three times that of North Korea and it possesses the world’s fourth largest petroleum reserves (more than four times that of the U.S.). It is also a nation of well educated citizens. What makes Iran even more dangerous is that it is closely allied with a handful of non-state groups with considerable military capabilities. While no nation is likely to dare use nuclear weapons, the possibility on a non-state organization doing so is much greater. Thus, just like Iran exercises control over the Strait of Hormuz, it also exercises control over its non-state allies. This substantially increases the danger of those satellite groups might obtain nuclear weapons and will have fewer inhibitions against employing them. This makes a nuclear Iran significantly more dangerous than a nuclear nation like Pakistan.
There is one other recent change that will affect the extent to which Iran will resist President Trump’s demand that Iran abandon its nuclear ambitions. The attacks by the U.S. and Israel has forced Iran to exercise its potential to control over commerce passing through the Strait of Hormuz. In many respects, that is even a greater deterrent against armed attacks than nuclear weapons. Moreover, this is a deterrent that cannot (or at least, should not) be easily ignored and it would be extremely costly for the U.S. and the other major powers of the world to try to prevent Iran from exercising it. For this reason, Iran just might be willing to make some concessions regarding its nuclear ambitions.
One countervailing consideration is that blocking the Strait of Hormuz will have little or no adverse impact on Israel which has been Iran’s principal adversary. Accordingly, if Iran is going to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, a way must be found to either restrain Israel or to eliminate the conflict between the two nations. Unfortunately, the most recent U.S./Israel attack on Iran has all, but completely, undermined the credibility of assurances from the U.S. that Israel will not continue to attack Iran. As a result, negotiating a comprehensive peace agreement with Iran will never be achieved until Iran and Israel resolve their differences. That, however, may be an even harder to achieve than convincing Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions.
Right now there is an emotional barrier standing in the way of peace negotiations. Both sides seem to believe that they possess a bargaining advantage and will prevail if they simply sit back and wait for the other to capitulate. Specifically, this past week, President Trump has spent virtually all of his time discussing his “ballroom” and the trade deals he reached in his discussions in China while not even mentioning the war in Iran. When asked by a reporter whether he was concerned that the war was placing economic hardships on Americans, he flatly responded “No” and explained that his only concern was ending Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Correspondingly, during the past three weeks the Iranians have refrained from making any further peace proposals.
It would thus appear that it is going to require some external force to prompt the parties back to the bargaining table.